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I 
INTRODUCTION 
Regulatory differences in the data privacy arena have been a recurring 
source of contention in transatlantic trade relations. In the 1990s, the focus was 
primarily on differences in the rules governing market actors. Over the past 
decade, however, the focus has expanded to include the public sector and the 
policies regulating the collection and use of personal data by government 
actors, particularly national security agencies. This article surveys the 
considerable history of transatlantic relations in the privacy area and the 
attempts that have been made to reconcile legal and policy differences in the 
interest of trade liberalization and police and national security cooperation. It 
then turns to the current dispute over National Security Agency (NSA) 
surveillance and discusses the factual and legal underpinnings of the dispute. 
The article demonstrates how this latest episode in transatlantic privacy both 
underscores longstanding legal differences and reveals fresh ones. The article 
concludes with observations regarding the impact of the NSA dispute on 
transatlantic privacy relations and on trade relations more broadly speaking. 
 
II 
HISTORY OF DATA PRIVACY IN TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS 
A. Regulatory Differences and Similarities 
In narrating the history of data privacy, the point of departure is generally 
taken to be the Code of Fair Information Practices set forth in an expert report 
commissioned by the United States Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare and published in 1973.1 To understand the current transatlantic dispute, 
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however, it bears taking one step back, to begin with the judgment of the 
German Constitutional Court in the Microcensus case.2 In 1969, the Court 
found that the personal information collected in large data banks was 
constitutionally protected under Articles 1 and 2 of the Basic Law (human 
dignity and the free development of personality).3 That litigation involved a 
challenge to the federal census, which the Court ultimately upheld, but only on 
condition that the information remain anonymous.4 This early case was 
followed, over ten years later, by the celebrated Census Act case in which the 
Court recognized a broad “right of informational self-determination 
(“informationelles Selbstbestimmungsrecht”).5 With the right of informational 
self-determination, the Court significantly extended its earlier jurisprudence. 
The Court recognized that the right of informational self-determination covered 
all personal information, and it abandoned the distinction that had been made 
in the Microcensus case between private information and information in the 
public domain. The Court also stated that the right came into being at the time 
of collection—at the moment that the individual was asked to give up the 
information—and not simply once it was used or misused by state actors and 
other types of data processors. 
The extraordinary possibilities of modern information technologies 
underpinned this conceptualization of the right of informational self-
determination. In language reminiscent of a recent report by the United States 
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board,6 the German Court wrote in 1983 
that 
[t]he [individual’s decisional] authority needs special protection in view of the present 
and prospective conditions of automatic data processing. It is particularly endangered 
because . . . the technical means of storing highly personalized information about 
particular persons today are practically unlimited, and [information] can be retrieved 
in a matter of seconds with the aid of automatic data processing, irrespective of 
distance. Furthermore, such information can be joined to other data collections—
particularly when constructing integrated information systems—to produce a partial 
or virtually complete personality profile, with the person concerned having insufficient 
means of controlling either its veracity or its use.
7
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In the Census Act case, the Court also expanded on the test that applies to 
all measures that interfere with basic rights, including privacy. Generally 
speaking, any interference with one of the rights protected under the Basic Law 
must be authorized by parliamentary law, serve a legitimate purpose, and satisfy 
the proportionality test, that is, suitability, necessity, and proportionality stricto 
sensu.8 In the case of the right of informational self-determination, the Court 
further specified that the legislative basis for personal data processing must be 
clear and precise and that, to satisfy proportionality, there must be 
organizational and procedural safeguards capable of preventing infringements 
of the right.9 
This constitutional frame has shaped both the jurisprudence of other 
constitutional courts—in particular the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)—as well as 
positive lawmaking in Germany and at the European level. Both the ECtHR 
and the European Court of Justice have recognized that the right to privacy, 
guaranteed under Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights, 
covers personal data and is triggered whenever public or private entities gather 
information that can be associated with an individual.10 Both courts use the 
same the jurisprudential framework of (1) a basis in law, (2) clearly defined, 
legitimate purposes, and (3) proportionality to analyze data-protection 
challenges, as will be discussed in connection with NSA surveillance. 
In the legislative sphere, the fundamental right to data privacy has shaped 
the design of data-protection legislation in most European jurisdictions. Within 
Germany, the Court’s first judgment in the Microcensus case provided much of 
the impetus for the first federal data-protection law. A small coalition party, the 
Free Democratic Party, took on the issue of new technologies and democracy, 
and, drawing on the case and the work of a number of prominent legal scholars, 
pressed for privacy legislation.11 A government bill was introduced in May 1973, 
and after a long series of parliamentary debates, mostly centered on the extent 
of private-sector coverage and the design of the enforcement system, a federal 
law was finally passed in January 1977.12 That law—together with a series of 
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the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the right to privacy is protected under Article 7 of the European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and the right to personal data protection is recognized specifically under Article 8 
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sectoral laws specific to areas such as telecommunications and the police—
served as the constitutionally required legislative act authorizing the 
interference with the right to privacy. The law set down the conditions for the 
use and sharing of personal information, most of which turned on the 
proportionality requirement that the data processor handle the information 
only insofar as “necessary” to accomplish the original purpose of the data 
operation.13 Further, it established a legal framework for oversight and 
enforcement.14 
The Court’s second judgment in the Census Act case also triggered 
parliamentary action, resulting in a series of amendments to the federal data-
protection law in 1990.15 In line with that case, some of the amendments were 
designed to extend privacy rights to the entire gamut of data processing 
activities: for instance, in the public sector, the collection of personal data—not 
simply the storage and use of personal data—was regulated for the first time.16 
Other amendments were designed to improve enforcement of the right: the 
independence of the Federal Data Protection Commissioner was improved,17 
state authorities acquired new enforcement powers,18 individuals were expressly 
given the right to vindicate their privacy rights in court, and the rules on proving 
damages were relaxed for lawsuits brought against both private and public 
bodies.19 
Turning to the positive law at the European level, both the Council of 
Europe Convention 108 (Convention 108) and the EU Data Protection 
Directive were shaped by the rights framework. This is particularly clear in the 
Directive, proposed in 1990 and adopted in 1995.20 Although the Directive was 
based on the market harmonization competence in the EC Treaty, designed to 
facilitate data flows and trade in Europe, it was essentially conceived as a 
measure that would improve protection of the fundamental right to privacy 
throughout Europe.21 The main proponents of the Directive were national data-
protection officials with a mission to safeguard the right to privacy, and they 
ensured that the purpose, structure, and text of the Directive were rooted in the 
logic of rights.22 Thus the Directive declared as its object that the “member 
 
EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 77–90 (1992); DAVID FLAHERTY, PROTECTING PRIVACY IN 
SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES: THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, SWEDEN, FRANCE, CANADA, 
AND THE UNITED STATES 22–24 (1989). 
 13.  Bundesdatenschutzgesetz [BDSG] [Federal Data Protection Act], 1977. 
 14.  BDSG, 1977 §§ 17–42; BENNETT, supra note 1212, at 180; FLAHERTY, supra note 12, at 25. 
 15.  BDSG, 1990. 
 16.  See id. § 13. 
 17.  See id. § 22(1). 
 18.  See id. § 38(5). 
 19.  See id. § 8. 
 20.  EP and Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC). 
 21.  See Francesca Bignami, Transgovernmental Networks vs. Democracy: The Case of the 
European Information Privacy Network, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 807, 834–44 (2005) [hereinafter 
Transgovernmental Networks]. 
 22.  See NEWMAN, supra note 11, at 74. 
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states shall protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and 
in particular their right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal 
data.”23 In line with the constitutional law on rights, the Directive serves as the 
law that authorizes the interference with the right to privacy implicated by any 
collection and use of personal information and, in accordance with the 
constitutional duty of clarity and precision, it sets down the exhaustive list of 
purposes for which such interference is allowed.24 And it satisfies the 
constitutional requirement of proportionality by limiting data processing to that 
which is necessary to accomplish the stated purpose and by establishing a set of 
organizational and procedural guarantees to protect against privacy violations.25 
Turning to the United States, there it is indeed appropriate to begin the 
historical account of data privacy with the Code of Fair Information Practices. 
This included a number of principles that remain prominent in contemporary 
privacy law: transparency in the use and processing of data; an individual right 
of access to and, if appropriate, correction of personal data; the duty (on the 
part of data users) to ensure the accuracy of personal data; the obligation to 
adopt security measures to prevent fraudulent uses of data; and a limitation on 
uses to the purposes for which the personal information was originally 
collected.26 The Fair Information Practices were adopted in the U.S. Privacy Act 
of 1974 and in numerous sector-specific U.S. laws.27 When, in 1980, a set of data-
protection guidelines was adopted by the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, a number of the American legal principles were 
included.28 These guidelines, in turn, influenced the negotiations on Convention 
108.29 And today, they are reflected in national privacy regulation in Europe, 
which give prominence to transparency, access, accuracy, security, and use 
limitations. 
Even though widespread adoption of Fair Information Practices has 
produced significant convergence in this policy area, not only between the 
United States and Europe but among jurisdictions globally, the historical 
trajectory on the American side of the Atlantic has also followed a distinctive 
path that has generated regulatory conflict with Europe and has given rise to a 
series of diplomatic efforts to render the two systems compatible. The first 
significant difference was and continues to be the absence of 
constitutionalization of the policy area. Even though the periodic expert reports 
 
 23. EP and Council Directive 95/46, supra note 20, art. 1. 
 24. Id. art. 7. 
 25. See Francesca Bignami, Cooperative Legalism and the Non-Americanization of European 
Regulatory Styles:  The Case of Data Privacy, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 411, 435–41 (2011) [hereinafter 
Cooperative Legalism]. 
 26.  RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS, supra note 1, at 33–46. 
 27.  DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW: CASES & 
MATERIALS 655–60 (2009). 
 28.  See Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy (What Larry 
Doesn’t Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 8. 
 29.  See COLIN J. BENNETT & CHARLES D. RAAB, THE GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY: POLICY 
INSTRUMENTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 75 (2003). 
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that have been commissioned in response to public concern over information 
technologies have generally canvassed the constitutional law in the domain of 
privacy and have underscored the importance of privacy for liberal values, they 
have all stopped short of recognizing that there is, or should be, a constitutional 
right to data privacy.30 The failure to reach such a conclusion is understandable 
because the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence does not squarely support such a 
conclusion. All of the older cases suggest that such a right does not exist,31 and 
even though the most recent decisions of the Court in the area indicate that the 
tide might be turning in light of the dramatic developments that have occurred 
in digital technologies, there still does not appear to be a solid majority in favor 
of a constitutional right to data privacy.32 
The second difference, related to the first, is the more limited safeguards for 
privacy in positive law. This is evident across a number of legislative enactments 
and, to use the constitutional framework described earlier, takes two primary 
forms. First, the substantive limits on collection, use, sharing, and retention of 
data that are loosely connected to the proportionality requirement of necessity 
are generally more relaxed in the United States than in Europe.33 To grossly 
oversimplify, in U.S. law, more information—from the collection phase to the 
erasure phase—is generally viewed as better than less information. Therefore, 
although U.S. and European law share similar commitments to transparency of 
databases, access to and correction of one’s personal data, reliability of personal 
information, and digital security, U.S. law contains fewer restrictions on how 
much personal data may be collected, how such data may be used, and how long 
that data may be kept. Second, in the United States, the enforcement of privacy 
law is largely entrusted to private litigants and courts, not administrative 
agencies. This is especially true for privacy regulation of the public sector, 
which lacks a powerful set of administrative overseers comparable to European 
data-protection authorities.34 The importance of courts, as opposed to 
administrative agencies, in the U.S. regulatory scheme has undermined public 
oversight because of the difficulty of analogizing privacy harms to traditional 
torts and the many doctrinal obstacles this has created for litigants seeking 
redress through the courts.35 
 
 30.  For recent examples, see generally LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD: 
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE AND 
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY (2013) [hereinafter LIBERTY AND SECURITY]; REPORT ON USA 
PATRIOT ACT, supra note 6. 
 31.  See generally Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); 
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
 32.  See generally Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014); United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 
(2012). 
 33.  See, e.g., FRANCESCA BIGNAMI, THE US LEGAL SYSTEM ON DATA PROTECTION IN THE 
FIELD OF LAW ENFORCEMENT:  SAFEGUARDS, RIGHTS AND REMEDIES FOR EU CITIZENS 36 (2015) 
[hereinafter BIGNAMI, THE US LEGAL SYSTEM], 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/519215/IPOL_STU(2015)519215_EN.pdf. 
 34.  Cooperative Legalism, supra note 25, at 419. 
 35.  Francesca Bignami, European versus American Liberty: A Comparative Analysis of 
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To illustrate briefly the more limited statutory safeguards for privacy under 
U.S law, compare the U.S. Privacy Act of 1974 with the Council of Europe’s 
Convention 108. The Privacy Act regulates the government’s collection, use, 
and disclosure of all types of personal information. It contains the familiar 
transparency, access and correction, reliability, and security principles. 
However, there are relatively few substantive limits on what can be done with 
personal information. Agencies can collect any personal information that is 
relevant and necessary to the agency’s legal purposes set down by congressional 
statute or presidential executive order.36 The only type of personal information 
that requires special justification to be collected is personal data “describing 
how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the First Amendment [right 
to freedom of expression and freedom of association]”37 as opposed to the 
numerous categories of information considered to be sensitive in Convention 
108, including racial origin, criminal convictions, and health information.38  
Although the Privacy Act generally prohibits sharing with other government 
agencies without the consent of the individual involved, it makes a broad 
exception for “routine uses” disclosed to the public at the time the record 
system is created.39 In contrast with the Convention, which says that personal 
data shall be “preserved in a form which permits identification of the data 
subjects for no longer than is required for the purposes for which those data are 
stored,”40 the Privacy Act contains no provision regulating the length of data 
retention. Last, in the case of intelligence and law enforcement agencies, most 
of these substantive requirements can be avoided if, at the time that legal notice 
of the database is given (part of the transparency duty), the agency claims the 
exemptions available under the Act.41 On the question of oversight, the Privacy 
Act confines enforcement to litigation and the courts: it gives individuals the 
right to sue the government for damages and, in some instances, to receive 
injunctive relief.42 Government officials may also be criminally prosecuted for 
certain violations of the Privacy Act.43 Although the original bill would have 
established an independent commission tasked with enforcement, similar to the 
model that took root in Europe in the 1970s, it was removed in the end as part 
of the compromise necessary to pass the Privacy Act.44 
 
Antiterrorism Data Mining, 48 B.C. L. REV. 609, 684–86 (2007) [hereinafter European versus American 
Liberty]. 
 36.  5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1) (2012). 
 37.  5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(7). 
 38.  See Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data, no. 108 (Jan. 28, 1981), art. 6 [hereinafter Convention 108]. 
 39.  5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3). 
 40.  Convention 108, supra note 38, art. 5e. 
 41.  5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)–(k). 
 42.  5 U.S.C. § 552a(g). 
 43.  5 U.S.C. § 552a(i). 
 44.  See S. 3148, 93d Cong. (1974) (original version with privacy commission); Privacy Act of 1974, 
Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (version without privacy commission); LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 at 119–24 (1976), http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/LH_privacy_act-
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The third significant transatlantic difference that emerged early on and that 
persists still today is the absence, in the United States, of a comprehensive, 
privacy law applicable to the private sector. Like an independent commission, 
regulation of the private sector was proposed in the early days of the policy 
area: the original version of the Privacy Act would have regulated personal data 
processing in both the public and private sectors.45 The Watergate scandal, 
however, was fresh in the minds of lawmakers, and the prospect of a 
government Big Brother was their principal fear.46 For their part, industry 
groups and many privacy experts successfully opposed comprehensive privacy 
regulation on the grounds that it was too early to discern which kinds of privacy 
problems would emerge in the private sector.47 They also argued that the 
diverse circumstances of various economic sectors would be handled best in 
tailored, sector-specific statutes rather than in a cross-cutting piece of 
legislation.48 Therefore, even though privacy statutes have been enacted to 
regulate a wide array of market sectors—banking, telecommunications, health 
care, credit reporting, and so on—there is no single omnibus law capable of 
capturing the data practices, sectors, and emerging technologies that fall in 
between the cracks of the individual statutes.49 
B. Regulatory Conflict and Cooperation 
Although many aspects of European and U.S. privacy regulation are being 
debated at present and may change in the near future, the deep-seated 
differences analyzed in the previous part are unlikely to disappear anytime soon 
and are vital to understanding the regulatory conflicts and attempts at 
harmonization of the past twenty years. Conflict with the United States has 
involved largely the European Union as opposed to individual member states. 
When privacy regulation first became a salient issue in transatlantic relations, in 
the mid-1990s, attention was mostly focused on the private sector and market 
actors. By the mid-2000s, however, U.S. government actors also came under 
scrutiny for their use of personal data to screen for suspected security threats as 
well as related criminal offenses. The following narrates both sets of disputes 
through to the revelations of NSA surveillance in summer 2013. 
1. Regulation of the Market: Safe Harbor 
The divergent U.S. and EU approaches to privacy regulation first emerged 
as a salient problem and a potential threat to transatlantic trade in the mid-
1990s. Like many of the early national data-protection laws that had preceded 
 
1974.pdf. 
 45.  S. 3418, 93d Cong. § 201 (1974). 
 46.  LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974, supra note 44, at 4, 832, 893. 
 47.  See, e.g., id. at 68. 
 48.  S. REP. NO. 93-1183, at 19–20 (1974). 
 49.  Examples of sector-specific statutes include the Right to Financial Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-
630 (1978), the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2012), and the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012). 
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it, the 1995 EU Directive contained a blocking provision that required national 
authorities to prohibit data transfers to jurisdictions without adequate privacy 
guarantees.50 In view of the lack of comprehensive marketplace regulation in 
the United States, U.S. firms with European operations feared that the U.S. 
legal framework would not be considered adequate and that, as a result, data 
transfers from Europe to the United States would be deemed illegal.51 In 
response, the U.S. Department of Commerce initiated negotiations with the 
European Commission and the two sides reached an agreement on “Safe 
Harbor” privacy principles that, if adopted by U.S. organizations, would entitle 
those organizations to a presumption of “adequacy” under the Directive.52 The 
Safe Harbor agreement took effect in 2000, as did the Commission decision 
granting those firms that adhered to the Safe Harbor principles an adequacy 
finding.53 Under the Safe Harbor agreement, the legal basis for collecting and 
using personal information is consent. Consent is assured by giving the 
consumer “notice” of personal data practices and by allowing the consumer 
“choice” respecting disclosures to third parties and uses of personal data that 
are incompatible with the original purpose of data collection. The Safe Harbor 
principles, in line with the Fair Information Practices discussed earlier, also 
include a right of individual access and correction, data security, limitations on 
use and data transfers, and independent dispute settlement as an enforcement 
mechanism. Firms that wish to invoke Safe Harbor must incorporate these 
principles in their privacy policy, make their privacy policy public and ensure 
that it is readily available to consumers, and self-certify their adherence to Safe 
Harbor on an annual basis with the Department of Commerce.54 Since firms 
hold themselves out as subscribing to the Safe Harbor principles, a violation of 
the principles can be sanctioned by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) under 
its powers to bring enforcement actions against unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices.55 
There has been considerable debate over the effectiveness of Safe Harbor, 
both as a vehicle for bringing U.S. corporate practices into line with EU law and 
as a tool for safeguarding consumer privacy. In the first years after Safe Harbor 
came into force, relatively few firms signed up, but today over 3,200 have self-
certified with the Department of Commerce.56 Although a number of observers 
have called into question whether the firms that hold themselves out as 
 
 50.  EP and Council Directive 95/46, supra note 20, arts. 25–26. 
 51.  See Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU and International 
Rules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy Standards, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 69–79 (2000). 
 52.  See Issuance of Safe Harbor Principles and Transmission to European Commission, 65 Fed. 
Reg. 45666-01 (July 24, 2000). 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  See id. 
 55.  See id. 
 56.  See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
Functioning of the Safe Harbour from the Perspective of the EU Citizens and Companies Established in 
the EU, at 4, COM (2013) 847 final (Nov. 27, 2013) [hereinafter Safe Harbor]. 
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complying actually do so, the FTC has recently begun taking a more proactive 
approach to enforcement. The well-publicized settlement orders against 
Google, Facebook, and Myspace all included Safe Harbor counts.57 
Additionally, the FTC has brought over a dozen enforcement actions against 
firms that claimed Safe Harbor membership but failed to renew their self-
certification with the Department of Commerce.58 
More broadly, there has been skepticism over whether consent—that is, 
notice and choice—operates as an effective device for safeguarding privacy. 
This skepticism applies not only to Safe Harbor but to U.S. and EU privacy 
regulation broadly speaking, which also rely heavily on consent.59 The privacy 
notices, which describe what will be done with personal information, are 
unwieldy, incomprehensible, and generally go unread by consumers. Even if 
privacy notices were comprehensible and effective disclosure might therefore 
exist, consumer choice is significantly limited by the very expansive 
interpretation of what uses are “compatible” with the original purposes of data 
collection and the difficulty of navigating electronic disclosures to opt out of 
those uses and third-party transfers that are “incompatible.” Furthermore, 
consumers are generally unable to choose among vendors based on their 
privacy practices because of the absence of significant differences in vendor 
policies. Overall, therefore, as a mode of policy coordination and regulatory 
cooperation in the context of a globalized data economy and multiple legal 
jurisdictions, Safe Harbor has proven quite successful. As a device for 
protecting consumer privacy, however, it has been less effective. Policy thinking 
has evolved considerably since the Safe Harbor agreement was negotiated over 
a decade ago and therefore it might very well be necessary to change the 
principles contained in Safe Harbor to assure adequate safeguards for privacy. 
The Safe Harbor agreement has recently been undone for reasons quite 
different from the consumer privacy concerns that originally motivated the 
agreement.60 As revealed by Snowden, U.S. Internet companies afford national 
security agencies extensive access to the personal information of their clients. 
However, the Safe Harbor agreement and the accompanying Commission 
adequacy decision are almost entirely focused on market actors and the privacy 
safeguards that apply when they handle consumer data. The legal instruments 
 
 57.  Complaint at 8, MySpace LLC, FTC File No. 102 3058, No. C-4369 (F.T.C. Aug. 30, 2012); 
Complaint at 19, Facebook, Inc., FTC File No. 092 3184, No. C-4365 (F.T.C. July 27, 2012); Complaint 
at 7, Google Inc., FTC File No. 102 3136, No. C-4336 (F.T.C. Oct. 13, 2011). 
 58.  See orders referenced at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/06/ftc-approves-
final-orders-settling-charges-us-eu-safe-harbor; and orders referenced in www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/2015/05/ftc-approves-final-orders-us-eu-safe-harbor-cases. 
 59.  See, e.g., Fred H. Cate, The Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles, in CONSUMER 
PROTECTION IN THE ‘INFORMATION ECONOMY’ 343 (Jane I. Winn ed., 2006); WHITE HOUSE, 
CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD: A FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY 
AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL DIGITAL ECONOMY 15, 21 (2012) (discussing 
guarantees above and beyond notice and choice entailed by the rights of “Respect for Context” and 
“Focused Collection”), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf. 
 60. See infra text accompanying notes 180–82. 
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have virtually nothing to say on the law that applies when the U.S. government 
seeks access to consumer data and whether that law is adequate from the 
perspective of EU law. As a result, as will be discussed at greater length later in 
this article, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has found that 
Safe Harbor can no longer be used as a legal basis for data transfers from the 
EU to the U.S.  
2. Regulation of Government Actors: PNR and SWIFT 
Shortly after 9/11, the EU and the United States became mired in a separate 
set of privacy conflicts—U.S. government access to EU airline passenger data 
and EU financial transactions data.61 This set of regulatory conflicts, unlike Safe 
Harbor, involved the public sector, specifically government agencies with 
responsibilities in the field of national security and criminal law. Many of the 
same regulatory differences that triggered the earlier dispute over the private 
sector were on display in this second round—the different definitions of 
permissible personal data processing and the absence, in the United States, of 
an independent enforcement agency—but were somewhat more surprising 
given the relatively robust nature of public sector regulation in the United 
States. As compared to the private sector, there is comprehensive statutory 
regulation of government actors—namely, the Privacy Act—and there exists a 
constitutional right to privacy against intrusive government surveillance. As 
already discussed, however, U.S. constitutional law is largely silent on the right 
to data privacy and the guarantees of U.S. statutory law are limited in the area 
of national security and law enforcement, a trend that has been exacerbated by 
the post-9/11 political climate. 
To understand the contours of this second round of regulatory conflict, it is 
necessary to first address the jurisdictional issue of how the regulation of police 
and national security agencies in the United States came to be part of the EU 
agenda. There are two parts to the answer. First, privacy regulation of the 
government and the market is interrelated, given that the government is a 
major user of personal information collected by private entities. Under the EU 
Directive and Safe Harbor, firms may disclose information to public actors, 
including law enforcement and national security agencies, if required to do so 
by law.62 In the case of European governments, which are subject to a 
fundamental right to personal data protection and to omnibus data-protection 
laws, the government’s collection of personal data must be based on a clear and 
precise legal authority and must respect the proportionality principle. When a 
non-European state requests such information from firms operating within its 
jurisdiction, and the request is not in line with the guarantees of European data-
protection law, then the privacy safeguards for the data in the foreign 
jurisdiction might not be considered “adequate.” In such a case, the data 
 
 61.  See generally European versus American Liberty, supra note 35, at 668–74. 
 62.  See EP and Council Directive 95/46, supra note 20, art. 7(c); Safe Harbor, supra note 56, 
Annex 1. 
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transfer is unlawful under Article 25 of the Directive and European authorities 
are empowered to take action to either block such transfers or to negotiate 
agreements that establish the appropriate safeguards in the foreign jurisdiction. 
The second explanation for the public-sector dimension to the U.S.–EU 
regulatory dispute is more straightforward: the powers of the EU have 
progressively expanded to include police, justice, and immigration.63 After the 
most recent round of treaty amendments contained in the Lisbon Treaty, these 
areas are squarely within the jurisdiction of the EU institutions.64 
In response to 9/11, the U.S. government embarked on an aggressive 
campaign to collect, pool, and analyze data with possible national security 
implications, and one of the casualties of this campaign has been a series of 
transatlantic disputes over the personal data of European citizens. The first 
involved the passenger name records (PNR) collected by airlines. After 9/11, 
the U.S. authorities began requiring that all airline carriers submit the PNR 
data for flights to, from, or through the United States. Given the breadth of the 
U.S. program—the amount of information involved, the extensive sharing 
among government agencies, and the unclear privacy safeguards—a number of 
European air carriers approached the European Commission for guidance on 
how to satisfy their EU Directive obligation to safeguard the privacy of data 
transferred to third countries.65 The significant regulatory differences between 
the EU and the United States—this time in the public domain—triggered 
lengthy negotiations over an agreement that would satisfy both security and 
privacy concerns. The two sides finally reached a deal in 2004.66 There have 
been three successive PNR agreements: The original 2004 agreement; its 2007 
replacement; and the agreement currently in force, from 2012.67 
Especially on the European side, the adequacy of the privacy safeguards 
afforded by the PNR agreements has been and continues to be contested by a 
number of institutional actors, including the European Parliament, the 
European Data Protection Supervisor, and the Article 29 Working Party.68 
 
 63.  See PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, EU LAW:  TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS 923–56 
(5th ed. 2011). 
 64.  See id. at 24–28. 
 65.  Transgovernmental Networks, supra note 21, at 862. 
 66.  Id. at 864–65. 
 67.  Commission Decision 2004/535, 2004 O.J. (L 235) 11; Agreement between the European 
Union and the United States of America on the Processing and Transfer of Passenger Name Record 
(PNR) Data by Air Carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 2007 O.J. 
(L 204) 18; Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the Use and 
Transfer of Passenger Name Records to the United States Department of Homeland Security, 2012 
O.J. (L 215) 5 [hereinafter 2012 Agreement]. 
 68.  See, e.g., Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 5/2007 on the Follow-up Agreement between the 
European Union and the United States of America on the Processing and Transfer of Passenger Name 
Record (PNR) Data by Air Carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security Concluded in 
July 2007 (Aug. 17, 2007), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2007/wp138_en.pdf; Letter from Article 29 Working Party to Member of the LIBE 
Committee of the European Parliament, Brussels, Ref. Ares (2012)15841-06/01/2012; European Data 
Protection Supervisor, Opinion on the Proposal for a Council Decision on the Conclusion of the 
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Compared to Safe Harbor, this dispute has festered longer. At least part of this 
acrimony can be attributed to post-9/11 politics and the fairly intransigent 
stance of successive U.S. administrations on security-related matters. 
The terms of cooperation set down under the current EU–U.S. PNR 
agreement cover the familiar privacy categories of transparency, individual 
access and correction, security, enforcement, and proportionality (which 
includes purpose, amount of data collected, sensitive data, retention of data, 
and data sharing).69 Before turning to proportionality and enforcement—the 
two major points of transatlantic difference reviewed earlier in this article and 
the source of most of the conflict in the PNR negotiations—it is worthwhile 
mentioning individual access and correction, since it raises issues that have also 
become prominent in the NSA surveillance controversy. European 
policymakers have long been perplexed by the exclusion of non-U.S. persons, 
that is, persons who are not U.S. citizens or legal permanent residents, from 
coverage under the Privacy Act of 1974. As will be explained below, this 
differential treatment of U.S. and EU persons has since come to the fore in the 
context of NSA surveillance because it also marks privacy guarantees in the 
national security domain. The exclusion of non-U.S. persons from the Privacy 
Act is important for the access and correction principle because it prevents 
Europeans from exercising access rights under that legislation. The EU–U.S. 
agreement, therefore, specifies that the Freedom of Information Act is to be 
used to obtain the information contained in the PNR held by the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS). 
Returning to proportionality and enforcement, the purposes of PNR data 
processing are limited mostly to preventing and prosecuting terrorist offenses 
and transnational crimes punishable by imprisonment of three years or more. 
Nineteen types of PNR data can be requested, and the transmission from the air 
carrier to DHS occurs via a “push” system, meaning that the carrier transmits 
the required data into DHS’s database.70 The “push” system is designed to 
reduce the risk that irrelevant data will be collected, which can occur when 
DHS is authorized to extract the PNR directly from the carrier’s reservation 
system through what is known as a “pull” system.71 Sensitive data—in the PNR 
 
Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the Use and Transfer of 
Passenger Name Records to the United States Department of Homeland Security, 2012/C 35/03 (Sept. 2, 
2012). 
 69.  2012 Agreement, supra note 67. For a general description of the operation of the program, see 
Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Joint Review of the 
Implementation of the Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the 
Processing and Transfer of Passenger Name Records to the United States Department of Homeland 
Security Accompanying the Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and to the Council 
on the Joint Review of the Implementation of the Agreement between the European Union and the United 
States of America on the Processing and Transfer of Passenger Name Records to the United States 
Department of Homeland Security, COM (2013) 844 final (Nov. 27, 2013). 
 70.  Id. at 14. 
 71.  See, e.g., Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 7/2010 on European Commission’s 
Communication on the Global Approach to Transfers of Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data to Third 
Countries, at 6 (Nov. 12, 2010), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-
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context, often religious affiliation revealed by meal preferences—can only be 
used under exceptional circumstances and are generally deleted after thirty 
days. PNR data are retained for fifteen years—five years in an “active” 
database and ten years in a “dormant” database—after which time they are 
anonymized; if data are used for a specific case or investigation they may be 
retained as long as necessary.72 Sharing this data with other domestic 
government agencies is allowed only for the counterterrorism and law 
enforcement purposes authorized by the agreement and even then, only “in 
support of those cases under examination or investigation.”73 Presumably, 
therefore, sharing does not occur in bulk, but rather only with reference to 
specific individuals or events being investigated. As for enforcement and 
oversight, the DHS Privacy Office is tasked with primary responsibility, but the 
agreement also mentions other “Department Privacy Officers,” the DHS Office 
of Inspector General, the Government Accountability Office, and the United 
States Congress.74 
In 2006, the second major dispute over privacy regulation of government 
actors emerged, this time over access to and use of financial data. Since 9/11, the 
United States Treasury Department, under a program known as the Terrorist 
Finance Tracking Program (TFTP), had been collecting vast quantities of 
financial data on bank transfers and other types of operations from the Belgian 
private entity the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial 
Telecommunications (SWIFT).75 SWIFT is the largest financial 
telecommunications network in the world and is the system used to execute and 
record most interbank transactions. Although it is established in Belgium, it had 
two operational servers, one in the Netherlands and a mirror server in the 
United States. Because of its presence in the United States, SWIFT was subject 
to the administrative subpoena power of the Department of Treasury, which is 
authorized to request financial information for counterterrorism purposes. But 
because SWIFT is established in Belgium and the vast majority of the data in 
the U.S. mirror server originated in the EU, SWIFT was also clearly subject to 
European privacy law and the duty under that law to ensure that privacy would 
be respected upon the transfer of that data to third countries. In fact, from the 
beginning, SWIFT knew that it was running the risk of violating European 
privacy law. Because it was prohibited under the terms of the administrative 
subpoena from disclosing the data transfers, SWIFT requested and received a 
“comfort letter” from the Department of Treasury in which the Department 
pledged to support SWIFT in the event that it was later sued by foreign 
governments or third parties. 
 
29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2010/wp178_en.pdf. 
 72.  2012 Agreement, supra note 67, at 8 (art. 8). 
 73.  Id. at 10 (art. 16). 
 74.  Id. at 10 (art. 14). 
 75.  For an account of the initial stages of the TFTP dispute, see European versus American 
Liberty, supra note 35, at 672–74. 
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When the TFTP was revealed in 2006, the European Parliament and 
European data-protection authorities strongly condemned the U.S. government 
for secretly and indiscriminately collecting the private financial records of 
millions of Europeans. Both the Belgian data-protection authority and the 
Article 29 Working Party found that SWIFT had violated European privacy 
law.76 The European Commission and the U.S. Department of Treasury 
subsequently entered into discussions to assuage European privacy concerns. 
The result was a number of Treasury representations laying out the scope of the 
privacy guarantees built into the TFTP and an agreement allowing an “eminent 
European person” appointed by the Commission to conduct periodic reviews to 
ensure that Treasury had complied with its representations.77 Although this 
oversight system did indeed result in two largely favorable reports to the 
Commission by the French magistrate Jean-Louis Bruguière,78 it was soon taken 
over by events: SWIFT announced in 2007 that it planned to establish a new 
operating center in Switzerland by 2009 so that intra-European bank messages 
could be stored exclusively in Europe.79 It therefore became urgent for the U.S. 
government to reach a deal with the EU to assure continued access to 
European financial transaction data once those data were physically removed 
from the United States and were therefore no longer subject to the U.S. 
administrative subpoena power. The first agreement, signed in 2009, was voted 
down by the European Parliament largely in reaction to what was perceived as 
a move by the Council and Commission to circumvent the Parliament’s new 
powers in the areas of police and judicial cooperation and external relations 
after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.80 The second EU–U.S. 
agreement (TFTP II), signed and ratified in summer 2010, is the agreement 
 
 76.  Belgian Data Protection Commission, Opinion No. 37/2006 of 27 Sept. 2006 on the Transfer of 
Personal Data by the CSLF SWIFT by Virtue of UST (OFAC) Subpoenas, at 26–27, 
http://www.steptoe.com/assets/attachments/2644.pdf; Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 10/2006 on the 
Processing of Personal Data by the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication 
(SWIFT) (Nov. 22, 2006), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2006/wp128_en.pdf. 
 77.  Notice: Publication of U.S./EU Exchange of Letters and Terrorist Finance Tracking Program 
Representations of the United States Department of the Treasury, 72 Fed. Reg. 60054-02 (Oct. 23, 
2007). 
 78.  Commission Report on the Joint Review of the Implementation of the Agreement between the 
European Union and the United States of America on the Processing and Transfer of Financial 
Messaging Data from the European Union to the United States for the Purposes of the Terrorist Finance 
Tracking Program (Mar. 13, 2011), http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/news/intro/docs/commission-
report-on-the-joint-review-of-the-tftp.pdf; Report on the Second Joint Review of the Implementation of 
the Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the Processing and 
Transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the European Union to the United States for the Purposes of 
the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (Dec. 14, 2012) [hereinafter Report on Implementation of 
Agreement], http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/pdf/20121214_joint_review_report_tftp_en.pdf. 
 79.  Andre R. Jaglom, Internet Distribution, E-Commerce and Other Computer Related Issues: 
Current Developments in Liability On-Line, Business Methods Patents and Software Distribution, 
Licensing and Copyright Protection Questions, SW041 ALI-CLE 687, 668–69 (2015). 
 80.   European Parliament Press Release, SWIFT: European Parliament Votes Down Agreement 
with the US (Nov. 2, 2010). 
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currently in force.81 
Similar to the PNR agreement, the privacy guarantees in TFTP II can be 
grouped into transparency; individual access and correction; security; 
enforcement; and proportionality, which includes purpose, amount of data 
collected, sensitive data, retention of data, and data sharing. The procedure 
outlined under the agreement requires that the Treasury issue requests for 
data—generally categories of data—that are “necessary” for purposes of 
prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of terrorism or terrorist 
financing and that are “tailored as narrowly as possible to minimise the amount 
of data requested.”82 Such requests are issued to SWIFT and to Europol, which 
must review the request for compliance with proportionality before SWIFT can 
release the data.83 Once the Treasury receives the data, it may only conduct 
individualized searches—not data mining—and only when it suspects that the 
subject in question has a “nexus to terrorism or its financing.”84 Although the 
agreement recognizes a category of “sensitive data,” it anticipates that the 
financial transaction data will rarely, if ever, implicate sensitive data; most likely 
for this reason, the agreement does not specify the special precautions that 
would be taken in the unlikely event that sensitive data were generated.85 
Retention periods differ for “extracted” and “non-extracted” data—non-
extracted data are to be deleted after five years, whereas extracted data can be 
retained for as long as necessary for the specific investigation or prosecution for 
which they are used.86 The information extracted in individualized searches may 
be shared with other law enforcement and national security agencies “for lead 
purpose only and for the exclusive purpose of the investigation, detection, 
prevention, or prosecution of terrorism or its financing.”87 Similar to PNR, 
oversight is entrusted primarily to the Privacy Office, this time in the Treasury 
Department. 
Even more so than the PNR agreement, TFTP II has failed to allay 
European privacy concerns and has been the object of repeated criticism by 
parliamentarians and European data-protection authorities.88 This can be 
explained by virtue of the sheer volume of personal data entailed and the 
secretive nature of the program. Whereas passenger name records are relatively 
 
 81.  Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the Processing 
and Transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the European Union to the United States for the 
Purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program, 2010 O.J. (L 195) 5 [hereinafter 2010 Agreement]. 
 82.  Id. at 8 (art. 4.2(c)). 
 83.  Id. at 8 (art. 4.4). 
 84.  Id. at 9 (art. 5.6). 
 85.  Id. at 9 (art. 5.7). 
 86.  Id. at 9 (art. 6). 
 87.  Id. at 9 (art. 7). 
 88.  See, e.g., Letter from Article 29 Working Party to Melissa A. Hartmen, Deputy Assistance 
Secretary, Privacy, Transparency and Records, U.S. Department of the Treasury (June 7, 2011); 
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, European Parliament, Minutes from Meeting 
of 3 October 2011, from 15.00 to 18.30, and 4 October 2011, from 09.00 to 12.30 and from 15.00 to 18.30, 
LIBE_PV(2011) 1003_1. 
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discrete data points, linked to a specific person and flight, the requests made 
under TFTP II are drawn broadly so as to capture possible terrorist financing. 
Moreover, whereas individuals may experience fairly immediate consequences 
from PNR—for instance, repeated secondary screening on entry in the United 
States, which may give rise to the access, correction, and oversight procedures 
outlined in the agreement—the financial data used in TFTP will generally only 
trigger visible government action when the individual is apprehended or 
prosecuted, making those provisions largely theoretical. Finally, transparency is 
particularly challenging in the TFTP context: the Treasury has argued that the 
effectiveness of the program would be undermined by the disclosure of the 
terms used to extract the data or the number of investigations supported by the 
financial data.89 
To conclude this discussion, it is important to note one element of 
transatlantic privacy conflicts in the public sector that sets them off from 
conflicts involving market regulation. As Henry Farrell and Abe Newman have 
argued, the U.S.–EU disputes over PNR and TFTP have not only set the EU 
against the United States but have exposed divisions between institutional 
actors within the EU.90 Ministries of Home Affairs, represented on the Council, 
and representatives of the more conservative political groups in the European 
Parliament, such as the European People’s Party, have generally been more 
favorable to sharing data with the United States than data-protection 
authorities and liberal and left-leaning parliamentarians. Moreover, these pro-
security actors have used U.S.–EU negotiations over PNR and TFTP to 
leverage more extensive powers for their own police and intelligence agencies: 
both PNR and TFTP II include provisions on reciprocity that require the U.S. 
authorities to share the data generated by the PNR and TFTP programs with 
their European counterparts.91 Furthermore, PNR and TFTP II have served as a 
springboard for similar intra-European data-sharing programs.92 These 
transatlantic disputes, therefore, both have exposed the conflicting positions of 
privacy and security advocates within the EU and have offered an opportunity 
for pro-security actors to enhance the EU’s law enforcement and national 
security capabilities. 
 
 89.  See, e.g., Report on Implementation of Agreement, supra note 78, at 5. 
 90.  See Henry Farrell & Abraham Newman, The New Politics of Interdependence: Cross-National 
Layering in Trans-Atlantic Regulatory Disputes, 48 COMP. POL. STUD. 1, 10–15 (2014); Abraham 
Newman, Transatlantic Flight Fights: Multi-level Governance, Actor Entrepreneurship and International 
Anti-terrorism Cooperation, 18 REV. OF INT’L POL. ECON. 481 (2011). 
 91.  2012 Agreement, supra note 67, at 11 (art. 20); 2010 Agreement, supra note 81, at 10 (arts. 10–
11). 
 92.  See, e.g., Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Use of 
the Passenger Name Record Data for the Prevention, Detection, Investigation and Prosecution of 
Terrorist Offences and Serious Crime, COM (2011) 32 final (Feb. 2, 2011). 
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III 
NSA SURVEILLANCE 
The latest chapter in the history of transatlantic disputes over data privacy 
began in 2013 with the Edward Snowden leaks of massive NSA surveillance. As 
with PNR and SWIFT, the EU–U.S. controversy concerns the activities of 
government agencies responsible for national security, but the immense scale of 
the NSA programs makes the other two seem fairly inconsequential by 
comparison. More than the previous episodes, the NSA’s activities have 
exposed rifts not only between the two sides of the Atlantic, but also within 
Europe, between security agencies and privacy institutions and between the 
actual practice of state security and the formal legal requirements and 
fundamental rights that are supposedly applicable against all state actors. As 
the European public learned from the Snowden leaks, the NSA has been 
routinely assisted by its counterparts in the United Kingdom, France, and other 
European countries even though many of the surveillance programs squarely 
implicate the European right to personal data protection. This part considers 
the implications of the NSA disclosure both for transatlantic relations and for 
the future evolution of EU privacy regulation. 
A. European Perspectives on the Snowden Leaks 
Much is unknown about the programs of mass surveillance carried out by 
the NSA and its European counterparts in the last decade. Western 
governments have frequently resorted to the state secrecy doctrine to maintain 
a veil of ignorance over the general features of intelligence programs.93 
However, as a result of the Snowden leaks and the official and unofficial 
disclosures that ensued, a series of basic facts have been clarified and can be 
assumed uncontroversial.94 Although the leaks concerned a truly spectacular 
array of surveillance activities, attention has focused on two in particular: One 
program, conducted under Section 215 of the Patriot Act, which collects the call 
records of virtually every American;95 and another, conducted under Section 
702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which is targeted at foreigners 
 
 93.  Interestingly, whereas the U.S. government has declassified many documents following the 
Datagate, European governments so far have not taken similar steps. 
 94.   See CASPAR BOWDEN, EUR. PARLIAMENT POL’Y DEPT., CITIZENS’ RTS. & CONST. AFF., 
THE U.S. SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMMES AND THEIR IMPACT ON EU CITIZENS' FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHTS (2013), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/libe/dv/briefingnote_ 
/briefingnote_en.pdf. 
 95.  See generally PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE 
RECORDS PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND THE 
OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT (2014) [hereinafter REPORT 
ON TELEPHONE RECORDS PROGRAM], https://www.pclob.gov/library/215-
Report_on_the_Telephone_Records_Program.pdf. For a detailed analysis, see Laura K. Donohue, 
Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and Constitutional Considerations, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
757, 770–76 (2014); David S. Kris, On the Bulk Collection of Tangible Things, 7 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & 
POL’Y 209 (2014). 
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and has as a result been the main focus of European criticism.96 
Under Section 702, the U.S. government is authorized to target for 
surveillance “non-US persons,” that is, not U.S. citizens or permanent residents, 
who are “reasonably believed to be located outside the United States,” in order 
“to acquire foreign intelligence information.”97 Unlike traditional foreign 
intelligence surveillance, the U.S. government need only certify the believed 
identity and location of the target; it is not required to show probable cause that 
the person is a lone-wolf terrorist or an agent of a foreign power.98  The NSA 
uses Section 702 to engage in two main types of electronic surveillance and bulk 
data collection. First, with PRISM collection, the government obtains content 
and metadata from Internet companies related to a “selector,” such as an e-mail 
address.99 The kind of information varies by provider and can include e-mails, 
videos, social networking details, and more. Second, with “upstream 
collection,” the government compels the assistance of the providers that control 
the telecommunications backbone over which communications transmit. 
Through this device, the government intercepts communications directly, again 
based on a “selector.”100 Upstream collection, unlike PRISM, can include the 
content of telephone conversations. In addition to these and similar programs, 
information has recently surfaced that the NSA, independently or in 
cooperation with foreign services, mainly the United Kingdom Government 
Communications Headquarters, has engaged in surveillance of EU institutions, 
member state embassies, and foreign leaders.101 One example is the much-
discussed interception of Chancellor Merkel’s telephone communications. 
Civil society actors, journalists, human rights nongovernmental 
organizations, ordinary citizens, and others were outraged to learn of the scale 
and nature of the surveillance programs. In contrast, the reaction of European 
governments was mixed. On one hand, they repeatedly voiced their strong 
objections to the U.S. authorities, as in the case of the alleged wiretapping of 
Chancellor Merkel’s telephone;102 on the other hand, they failed to address 
head-on the leaked information that implicated European intelligence 
 
 96.  See generally PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE 
SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
SURVEILLANCE ACT (2014) [hereinafter REPORT ON SECTION 702 SURVEILLANCE], 
https://www.pclob.gov/library/702-Report.pdf. 
 97.  50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a) (2012). 
 98. BIGNAMI, THE US LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 33, at 25. 
 99.  See REPORT ON SECTION 702 SURVEILLANCE, supra note 96, at 7. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  See Dieter Deiseroth, Nachrichtendienstliche Überwachung durch US-Stellen in Deutschland –
Rechtspolitischer Handlungsbedarf?, 2013 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSPOLITIK 194; DIDIER BIGO ET 
AL., NATIONAL PROGRAMS FOR MASS SURVEILLANCE OF PERSONAL DATA IN EU MEMBER STATES 
AND THEIR COMPATIBILITY WITH EU LAW 7 (2013) [hereinafter NATIONAL PROGRAMS FOR MASS 
SURVEILLANCE], http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/493032/IPOL-
LIBE_ET(2013)493032_EN.pdf. 
 102.  See generally Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, Europäer sind nicht Bürger zweiter Klasse 
im Datenschutz, 2013 MULTIMEDIA UND RECHT 481 
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agencies.103 Indeed, in contrast with the United States, which has openly 
admitted the existence of the NSA programs and has confirmed their main 
features, the member states have so far failed to give detailed explanations of 
their surveillance programs and have maintained the classified status of most of 
the relevant documents.104 
The Snowden leaks and the journalistic and parliamentary inquiries that 
have been conducted to date unequivocally demonstrate that several European 
intelligence agencies have actively participated in the implementation of the 
NSA programs and have themselves collected a vast amount of data and 
information subsequently made available, generally on the basis of reciprocity, 
to their foreign counterparts.105 In particular, the United Kingdom has 
cooperated closely with the NSA, setting up an extremely powerful system of 
large-scale surveillance.106 According to some allegations, it seems also that the 
Governmental Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) infiltrated the Belgian 
communication provider Belgacom to collect data on European institutions.107 
Such activities are not to be explained only on the basis of the long-lasting 
U.K.–U.S. relationship in the field of intelligence—a relationship that is also 
backed by a substantial financial contribution from the Unites States to 
GCHQ.108 Instead, there is sufficient evidence that the agencies of other 
European countries, such as Germany, France, Sweden, and the Netherlands, 
have carried out similar mass-surveillance programs. Among such programs are 
the direct control of communications nodes known as “upstreaming,” 
systematic access to private-sector data, and the use of decryption software.109 
The scale and technological sophistication of these programs are probably 
not comparable to the U.S. surveillance programs. There is no doubt, however, 
that mass surveillance of communications has been carried out by European 
agencies, and that in most cases a vast amount of personal data—content data 
and metadata—has been made available to their U.S. counterparts.110 From a 
European perspective, therefore, it is necessary to acknowledge that mass 
 
 103.  NATIONAL PROGRAMS FOR MASS SURVEILLANCE, supra note 101, at 9–19. 
 104.  Id.; Stefan Heumann, Die NSA in aller Munde—und was ist mit dem BND?, CARTA (Mar. 3, 
2011), http://www.carta.info/66295/die-nsa-in-aller-munde-und-was-ist-mit-dem-bnd/; Working Party, 
Working Document on Surveillance of Electronic Communications for Intelligence and National Security 
Purposes, at 9 (Dec. 5, 2014) [hereinafter Working Document], http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2014/wp228_en.pdf. 
 105.  For a detailed analysis, see NATIONAL PROGRAMS FOR MASS SURVEILLANCE, supra note 
101, at Annex 1. 
 106.  This program is code-named TEMPORA and consists of the routine interception of submarine 
cables, with the aim of gaining knowledge of the content of Internet communications. See id. at 51. 
 107.  Belgacom Attack: Britain's GCHQ Hacked Belgian Telecoms Firm, DER SPIEGEL (Sept. 20, 
2013), http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/british-spy-agency-gchq-hacked-belgian-telecoms-
firm-a-923406.html. 
 108.  Nick Hopkins & Julian Borger, Exclusive: NSA Pays £100m in Secret Funding for GCHQ, THE 
GUARDIAN, (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/aug/01/nsa-paid-gchq-spying-
edward-snowden; see NATIONAL PROGRAMS FOR MASS SURVEILLANCE, supra note 101, at 54–55. 
 109.  Id. at 19–26. 
 110.  Working Document, supra note 104, at 9. 
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surveillance is by no means a solely U.S. issue. It also raises the question, again 
from a European viewpoint, of the legal basis and legitimacy of both the EU 
and U.S. surveillance operations, discussed next. 
B. The Lawfulness of U.S. Surveillance 
The Section 702 program has attracted significant criticism in Europe. As 
discussed earlier in the analysis of PNR and TFTP II, there are several different 
types of privacy guarantees generally believed to be important under European 
law: transparency, individual access and correction, accuracy, security, 
oversight, and proportionality. As in the earlier transatlantic privacy disputes, 
the European reaction has been partly driven by the argument that these 
standards have not been met. It is obviously impossible and undesirable to 
ensure complete transparency, individual access and correction, and oversight 
in the area of intelligence gathering, but the degree of freedom afforded to 
surveillance actors under the Section 702 program has been a source of 
puzzlement. 
Consider first the European constitutional requirement of a basis in law for 
any infringement of the right to personal data protection. Although the current 
version of the Section 702 program is conducted, unlike earlier versions,  
pursuant to a congressional law that sets down different substantive and 
procedural criteria, the type of personal information that may be gathered—
foreign intelligence information involving non-U.S. persons located outside of 
the United States—is not clearly defined.111 As noted in the report of the EU 
Data Protection Working Party, “foreign intelligence could, on the face of the 
provision, include information concerning the political activities of individuals 
or groups, or activities of government agencies, where such activity could be of 
interest to the United States for its foreign policy.”112 It could also include 
activities relevant to U.S. economic interests.113 The U.S. government, 
questioned on the exact scope of the notion, refused to give a detailed answer 
on the grounds that this would compromise the efficacy of intelligence 
activities.114 Moreover, FISA contains no limitation on the geographical reach of 
the surveillance, and it therefore could, in principle, cover not only the 
operations of service providers in the United States, but also data stored in the 
cloud and data processed by subsidiaries of U.S. companies located in the EU. 
 
 111.   For a detailed analysis of the history and content of Section 702, see LIBERTY AND SECURITY, 
supra note 30, at 130. 
 112.   Report on the Findings by the EU Co-Chairs of the Ad Hoc EU–US Working Group on Data 
Protection, at 4 (Nov. 27, 2013) [hereinafter Report], http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/files/report-findings-of-the-ad-hoc-eu-us-working-group-on-data-protection.pdf. 
 113.  The President, however, has stated that the collection of foreign commercial information is not 
authorized for purposes of affording a commercial advantage to U.S. companies. Office of the Press 
Sec’y, Presidential Policy Directive—Signals Intelligence Activities, § 1(c), WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 17, 2014) 
[hereinafter PPD-28], http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/presidential-policy-
directive-signals-intelligence-activities. 
 114.  Id. 
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Turning to the safeguards afforded by judicial oversight, at first blush they 
appear substantial when compared with Europe’s corresponding judicial 
safeguards. In many European systems, oversight is conducted by special 
parliamentary committees or executive bodies, and does not contemplate a role 
for the courts. By contrast, under FISA, a special court comprised of ordinary 
judges (the FISA Court) supervises intelligence surveillance. In the context of 
Section 702, however, the powers of the FISA Court are relatively limited: it 
only approves the type of foreign intelligence information being collected, the 
targeting procedures used by the NSA to conclude that surveillance will lead to 
the acquisition of foreign intelligence information on a non-U.S. person outside 
of the United States, and the minimization procedures used to prevent the 
collection and use of information on U.S. persons.115 In contrast with traditional 
FISA surveillance, the FISA Court does not review applications for the 
surveillance of specific individuals.116 Furthermore, the FISA Court’s orders are 
classified and companies that are required to cooperate with the NSA, under 
the authority of the orders, are bound to secrecy. As a result, there is no way for 
data subjects to be informed that their personal data are being collected or 
processed.117 Relatedly, individuals have no right to obtain access, rectification, 
or erasure of data, and the prospect of administrative or judicial redress is 
virtually nonexistent. The difficulty of obtaining a judicial remedy, absent a 
criminal prosecution based on unlawfully acquired evidence, was confirmed in 
Clapper v. Amnesty International USA.118 In that case, the Supreme Court found 
that the petitioners—human rights lawyers and others who communicated with 
clients abroad—did not have standing because the claim that their telephone 
communications were likely to be intercepted was “too speculative.”119 
NSA surveillance has also raised proportionality issues familiar from the 
previous rounds of transatlantic conflict. One feature of the surveillance 
programs that has attracted much attention is the lack of protection for 
metadata.120 In the context of the Section 215 call records program, the U.S. 
government has confirmed that the NSA collects call metadata from all major 
telecommunications companies and maintains a database of all such calls for 
five years.121 This is done irrespective of the safeguards formally set forth by the 
Fourth Amendment—judicial warrant and probable cause—but consistent with 
the interpretation given by the Supreme Court in the 1970s, according to which 
 
 115.  REPORT ON SECTION 702 SURVEILLANCE, supra note 96, at 26–27. 
 116.  See L. Rush Atkinson, The Fourth Amendment’s National Security Exception: Its History and 
Limits, 66 VAND.  L. REV. 1343, 1399 (2013). 
 117.  See Report, supra note 112, at 16; Sudha Setty, Surveillance, Secrecy, and the Search for 
Meaningful Accountability, 51 STAN. J. INT’L L. 69, 82–84 (2015). 
 118.  133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). 
 119.  See Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1935 (2013). 
 120.  See generally Bryce Clayton Newell, The Massive Metadata Machine: Liberty, Power and Secret 
Mass Surveillance in the U.S. and Europe, 9 J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 481 (2014). 
 121.  See Report, supra note 112, at 11; REPORT ON TELEPHONE RECORDS PROGRAM, supra note 
95, at 25; Kris, supra, note 95, at 221. The program was amended by Congress in June 2015, but the 
retention period was not modified. 
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there is no “reasonable expectation of privacy” for personal data entrusted to a 
third party.122 As explained at the beginning of this article, the EU takes the 
opposite approach: metadata is considered “personal data” and therefore must 
be collected and processed according to the general principles of data-
protection law. 123  Another anomaly with respect to European law is how 
privacy principles are applied to bulk collection. The U.S. intelligence 
community takes the position that the acquisition of personal data does not 
amount, in and of itself, to “processing”; data are processed only at the moment 
when they are analyzed by a human being.124 In other words, the default 
position in U.S. national security law is that privacy concerns arise only when 
the information is accessed by a human being. This view stands in contrast with 
European law, under which the right to personal data-protection is triggered at 
the moment of collection, and facilitates more extensive bulk collection than is 
contemplated under European law. 
In addition to these well-known transatlantic differences, the Snowden leaks 
have introduced a new bone of contention in transatlantic privacy relations—
the dramatic difference in U.S. law between the treatment of citizens and non-
citizens. Even more than PNR and TFTP, the NSA programs have brought into 
sharp focus the two-track scheme that runs throughout U.S. privacy law and 
that results in relatively few guarantees for EU citizens.125 This is particularly 
apparent under Section 702.126 The surveillance authorized under Section 702 is 
directed at foreign citizens who are not legal residents and who are believed to 
be located outside the United States.127 A corollary of this basic mission is that 
most of the limitations contained in Section 702 seek to protect U.S. persons 
from being swept up in foreign intelligence surveillance.128 The targeting and 
minimization procedures subject to the approval of the FISA Court are aimed 
at protecting the privacy of U.S. persons, not foreign citizens. This two-track 
scheme also marks U.S. constitutional law. All government surveillance must 
respect the privacy guarantees contained in the Fourth Amendment, but the 
Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to 
nonresident aliens located abroad.129  In other words, most of the EU citizens 
 
 122.  See European versus American Liberty, supra note 35, at 624. 
 123.  See Malone v. U.K., 7 Eur. Ct. H.R. 14 (1984); see also Case C-293/12, Digital Rights Ireland 
Ltd. v. Minister for Communc’s, Marine and Natural Res., 2014 E.C.R (2014). 
 124.  See Report, supra note 112, at 9. 
 125.  See generally BIGNAMI, THE US LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 33, at 36. 
 126.  See Konrad Lachmayer & Normann Witzleb, The Challenge to Privacy From Ever-Increasing 
State Surveillance: A Comparative Perspective, 37 U.N.S.W. L.J. 748, 764 (2014); LIBERTY AND 
SECURITY, supra note 30. 
 127.  See LIBERTY AND SECURITY, supra note 30, at 135. 
 128.  See Christopher Kuner, Foreign Nationals and Privacy Protection: A Comparative 
Transatlantic Analysis, in DATA PROTECTION ANNO 2014: HOW TO RESTORE TRUST?: 
CONTRIBUTIONS IN HONOUR OF PETER HUSTINX, EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR 
(2004–2014) 213 (Hielke Hijmans & Herke Kranenborg eds., 2014). 
 129. According to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 
259, 265–68 (1990), the Fourth Amendment does not guarantee rights for non-U.S. persons outside the 
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implicated by NSA surveillance have no privacy rights under the U.S. 
Constitution. 
To be fair, many, if not most, countries operate with surveillance laws that 
afford heightened privacy protections to their own citizens. For example, 
German law authorizes its intelligence services to carry out surveillance only on 
telecommunications connections that are not regularly used by German citizens, 
thereby treating non-Germans less favorably.130 What is more exceptional is the 
denial of any human rights protection for foreigners. Many constitutions and 
international treaties—including Article 17 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which the United States is party—protect 
privacy as a human right vested in all persons.131 Thus the constitutional 
jurisprudence of countries like Germany does not draw a categorical difference 
between the rights afforded to citizens and foreigners. A number of European 
commentators have argued that because the United States permits the virtually 
unrestricted surveillance of the communications of foreigners located outside of 
its territory, it violates its human rights obligations under the ICCPR.132 
The extraterritorial application of human rights treaties is a controversial 
issue and it is not easy to predict how it will be resolved in the field of mass 
surveillance.133 On this scope issue, however, as on the substance of privacy 
rights, there are significant differences between the United States and Europe. 
The United States has traditionally argued that under the ICCPR states are 
only responsible for human rights violations on their own territory, not 
extraterritorially.134 By contrast, the European approach is somewhat more 
 
United States. Rather, the Fourth Amendment protects the rights of “the people,” that is, “a class of 
persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection 
with this country to be considered part of that community.” Applying this model, several scholars have 
argued that the Fourth Amendment is not implicated by the mass-surveillance of foreign 
communications carried out by the NSA. See John Yoo, The Legality of National Security Agency’s 
Bulk Data Surveillance Programs, 37 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 901, 919 (2014); Judith Rauhofer & 
Caspar Bowden, Protecting Their Own: Fundamental Rights Implications for EU Data Sovereignty in 
the Cloud 23–25 (Univ. of Edinburgh Sch. of Law, Research Paper Series No. 2013/28), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2283175 (referencing the personal data of 
foreigners stored by U.S. based cloud computing providers). 
 130.  Kuner, supra note 128, at 13. 
 131.  See G.A. Res. 68/167 (Jan. 21, 2014); High Commissioner for Human Rights, The Right to 
Privacy in the Digital Age: Rep. of the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, at 6, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/27/37 (June 30, 2014). 
 132.  See Wolfgang Ewer & Tobias Thienel, Völker-, unions- und verfassungsrechtliche Aspekte des 
NSA-Datenskandals, 2014 NJW 30, 32; Markus Kotzur, Datenschutz als Menschenrecht?, 2013 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSPOLITIK 216, 218; see also Ilina Georgieva, The Right to Privacy under Fire – 
Foreign Surveillance under the NSA and the GCHQ and Its Compatibility with Art. 17 ICCPR and Art. 8 
ECHR, 31 Utrecht J. Int’l & Europ. L. 104, 124 (2015). 
 133.  On the general issue of extraterritorial application of human rights treaties, see MARKO 
MILANOVIC, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: LAW, PRINCIPLES 
AND POLICY 7–9 (2011). 
 134.   Marko Milanovic, Human Rights Treaties and Foreign Surveillance: Privacy in the Digital Age, 
56 HARV. INT. L.J. 81, 102–08 (2015); see also Beth Van Schaack, The United States’ Position on the 
Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Obligations: Now Is the Time for Change, 90 INT’L L. 
STUD. 20, 22–34 (2014). 
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flexible. The European Convention of Human Rights, which is framed in 
different terms than the ICCPR, has been applied by the ECtHR and the 
Commission of Human Rights in cases of extraterritorial violations of human 
rights.135 To avoid irrational or unfeasible results, the ECtHR has limited the 
obligation of the member states to respect the rights guaranteed by the 
Convention to two main situations: First, the spatial model, which is the de 
facto effective control over an area;136 and second, the personal jurisdiction 
model, or the exercise of authority and control over an individual.137 If such 
jurisdictional criteria are satisfied, then a state in question may be answerable 
even for extraterritorial violations. 
The ECtHR’s approach to extraterritoriality has been developed mainly 
regarding cases concerning the infringement of the right to life, liberty, and 
personal integrity.138 Applying it to interferences with privacy is a difficult task, 
largely because such interferences are typically incorporeal and do not require 
the exercise of physical powers over the person. To gain traction over the issue, 
it is useful to distinguish, following a suggestion by Marko Milanovic,  among 
three different factual scenarios: (1) The surveillance is carried out on the 
state’s own territory and the target is located inside the national borders; (2) the 
surveillance is carried out, or the resulting data are processed, on the state’s 
own territory but the target is located abroad;139 and (3) the person is located 
abroad and the interference with privacy takes place outside the state’s own 
territory. Under the ECtHR’s spatial model of jurisdiction, one could argue that 
both the first and second scenarios justify the application of the Convention.140  
The third situation is more problematic because it is not covered by the 
spatial model, and even under the personal model, it is not clear whether the 
interception of communications or the bulk collection of metadata would 
qualify as an exercise of “authority or control” over an individual. Milanovic 
has recently argued that the right to privacy under the ECHR should be applied 
extraterritorially in this third situation as well, noting that it would be irrational 
to treat differently factual situations that involve the same set of substantive 
 
 135.  See generally Milanovic, supra note 134; THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS § 1.4.3.M (Pieter Van Dijk et al. eds., 2006). 
 136.  Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995). 
 137.  Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R. 18, para. 137 (2011). The 
Court stated: 
It is clear that, whenever the State through its agents exercises control and authority over an 
individual, and thus jurisdiction, the State is under an obligation under Article 1 to secure to 
that individual the rights and freedoms under Section 1 of the Convention that are relevant to 
the situation of that individual. In this sense, therefore, the Convention rights can be “divided 
and tailored.” 
Id. 
 138.  See generally Milanovic, supra note 134, at 37–48. 
 139.  For a similar case, see Weber v. Germany, App. No. 54934/00, 2006-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1173 
(2006). 
 140.   See Milanovic, supra note 134, at 60. 
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problems.141 The interferences with privacy under the Section 702 program, 
however, do not appear to trigger this more complex scenario but rather seem 
to fall under the second scenario, given that both PRISM collection and 
upstream collection take place on U.S. territory.142 One could argue, therefore, 
that if personal data of European citizens are collected and processed by the 
NSA without complying with the procedural and substantive requirements of 
Article 17 of the ICCPR, the overall situation would be highly asymmetrical: 
American citizens would be protected by Article 8 of the European Convention 
of Human Rights (with respect to surveillance carried out by European 
intelligence and police authorities), whereas Europeans would not enjoy similar 
guarantees vis-à-vis  surveillance by U.S. authorities. 
In addition to the discriminatory application of privacy rights, another novel 
element of the current transatlantic dispute involves the methods that have 
been used by the NSA to gather intelligence on Europeans. The first part of this 
article described two official channels through which the U.S. government can 
obtain personal data on Europeans—pursuant to the PNR agreement and to 
the TFTP II agreement. There also exists the Mutual Legal Assistance 
Agreement between the EU and United States, which makes it possible, under 
certain conditions, to gather and exchange data for the prevention and 
investigation of criminal activities, including international terrorism.143 In the 
eyes of some European commentators, the U.S. authorities have deliberately 
circumvented these official channels by collecting data directly from private 
service providers, an action they claim might even amount to a violation of 
international law. 
C. The Lawfulness of European Surveillance 
As mentioned above, according to initial reports, it appears that some of the 
largest European intelligence agencies, including those of England, France, and 
Germany, have actively cooperated with the NSA and have collected and 
probably exchanged large amounts of personal data on European citizens, 
including many who have never been the object of a counterterrorism or 
criminal investigation.144 This has revealed the rift, discussed earlier in the 
context of PNR and TFTP II, between different European actors. Although 
data-protection authorities and certain liberal political parties have championed 
privacy rights,145 they have always met with powerful resistance from the forces 
 
 141.   Id. at 60–61. 
 142.  See generally BOWDEN, supra note 94, at 13–24. 
 143.  See Letter from EU Vice-President Viviane Reding to U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder, at 2 
(June 10, 2013), http://edri.org/files/holder.pdf. 
 144.  For a detailed overview, see generally NATIONAL PROGRAMS FOR MASS SURVEILLANCE, 
supra note 101. 
 145.  See, e.g., Working Document, supra note 104; Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 04/2014 on 
Surveillance of Electronic Communications for Intelligence and National Security Purposes (Apr. 10 
2014) [hereinafter Opinion 04], http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-
29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2014/wp215_en.pdf. 
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of law and order, and in particular, the national security establishment. The 
allegations of mass data collection and processing by European intelligence 
services also raise the question of whether a gap exists between the law on the 
books and the actual operation of state activities: Have the principles of 
European data-protection law been violated? Various complaints have already 
been lodged both before national and supranational courts,146 but even at this 
early stage it is possible to clarify some general points. 
At the outset, it should be noted that the legal framework governing the 
various intelligence programs is highly fragmented. As a policy area, national 
security falls outside the competences of the EU and is reserved for the member 
states.147 The laws regulating the powers, internal organization, and 
responsibilities of intelligence and security agencies, as well as oversight 
mechanisms, tend to vary significantly among different European countries.148 
Notwithstanding this diversity, a number of general principles can be 
derived from the European constitutional framework and from the harmonized 
European law of data protection. Because the European Convention on Human 
Rights governs all the activities of European states, including national security 
surveillance, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR is the most clearly applicable 
body of law. As explained earlier, the right to privacy under Article 8 of the 
Convention is triggered whenever public or private bodies gather information 
that can be associated with a person. For processing to be lawful, there must be 
a basis in law, a clearly defined purpose set down in that law, and 
proportionality. The Court has adapted these general requirements to the 
specific context of surveillance by national intelligence services in what, by now, 
constitutes a fairly substantial line of jurisprudence. 
First, in the 1978 case of Klass and Others v. Germany,149 the Court held that 
any person whose communications are likely being monitored under a secret 
intelligence program, even if it cannot be shown that he or she was actually a 
victim of surveillance, has standing to sue.150 In other words, an application is 
 
 146.  The ECtHR has affirmed the admissibility of the case Big Brother Watch v. U.K., App. No. 
58170/13 (2013); see also Liberty v. Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 
UKIPTrib 13_77-H (2015) (declaring the regime that governs the sharing between Britain and the 
United States of electronic communications intercepted in bulk was unlawful for breach of Art. 8 
ECtHR prior to the disclosures made during the court proceedings). Also particularly relevant is the 
recent decision of the CJEU, Grand Chamber, is Case 362/14, Schrems v. Data Protection 
Commissioner (2015), discussed below. 
 147.  Treaty on European Union Art. 4(2), Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326); see also Opinion 04, 
supra note 145, at 6–7. 
 148.  See DIRECTORATE GEN. FOR INTERNAL POLICIES, PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT OF 
SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2011). A complete legal 
analysis, therefore, would require proceeding jurisdiction by jurisdiction, something which would 
exceed the scope of this article. 
 149.  Klass v. Germany, App. No. 5029/71, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1978). 
 150.  Id. §§ 34–38 (laying down the principle according to which “an individual may, under certain 
conditions, claim to be the victim of a violation occasioned by the mere existence of secret measures or 
of legislation permitting secret measures, without having to allege that such measures were in fact 
applied to him. The relevant conditions are to be determined in each case according to the Convention 
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considered admissible even in the absence of concrete evidence of harm. As the 
Court observed in Weber and Saravia v. Germany: 
[T]he mere existence of legislation which allows a system for the secret monitoring of 
communications entails a threat of surveillance for all those to whom the legislation 
may be applied. This threat necessarily strikes at freedom of communication between 
users of the telecommunications services, and thereby amounts to an interference with 
the exercise of the applicants’ rights under Article 8, irrespective of any measures 
actually taken against them.151 
This relatively permissive test for obtaining standing contrasts with the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s position, affirmed in Clapper, that the mere threat of 
surveillance does not establish standing.152 
Once the Court finds that the surveillance in question amounts to an 
interference with the right to privacy under Article 8, it examines whether the 
interference is provided for by the law and is necessary in a democratic society to 
achieve the aims mentioned in Article 8(2) of the Convention.153 Roughly 
speaking, “provided for by law” maps onto the legal basis and purpose 
requirements discussed in the first part of this article, whereas “necessary in a 
democratic society” tracks this article’s proportionality analysis. 
In the context of intelligence operations, the Court has repeatedly stated 
that the “law” authorizing secret surveillance programs must “be accessible to 
the person concerned, who must, moreover, be able to foresee its consequences 
for him, and compatible with the rule of law.”154 To understand the Court’s 
jurisprudence, it is useful to reproduce in full the following passage on 
foreseeability, applicable both to the interception of individual communications 
and to mass electronic surveillance programs: 
[F]oreseeability in the special context of secret measures of surveillance, such as the 
interception of communications, cannot mean that an individual should be able to 
foresee when the authorities are likely to intercept his communications so that he can 
adapt his conduct accordingly . . . [h]owever, especially where a power vested in the 
executive is exercised in secret, the risks of arbitrariness are evident . . . [i]t is 
therefore essential to have clear, detailed rules on interception of telephone 
conversations, especially as the technology available for use is continually becoming 
more sophisticated . . . . The domestic law must be sufficiently clear in its terms to give 
citizens an adequate indication as to the circumstances in which and the conditions on 
which public authorities are empowered to resort to any such measures . . . . [T]he law 
must indicate the scope of any such discretion conferred on the competent authorities 
and the manner of its exercise with sufficient clarity to give the individual adequate 
protection against arbitrary interference. In its case-law on secret measures of 
surveillance, the Court has developed the following minimum safeguards that should 
be set out in statute law in order to avoid abuses of power: the nature of the offences 
which may give rise to an interception order; a definition of the categories of people 
liable to have their telephones tapped; a limit on the duration of telephone tapping; the 
 
right or rights alleged to have been infringed, the secret character of the measures objected to, and the 
connection between the applicant and those measures”). 
 151.  Weber v. Germany, App. No. 54934/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. § 78 (2006) [hereinafter Weber 
Decision] (emphasis added). 
 152.  133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). 
 153.  Weber Decision, supra note 151, § 80. 
 154.  Id.§ 84. 
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procedure to be followed for examining, using and storing the data obtained; the 
precautions to be taken when communicating the data to other parties; and the 
circumstances in which recordings may or must be erased or the tapes destroyed.155 
Applying this jurisprudence on the “law” required to authorize the 
interference with the privacy right, the ECtHR held against the United 
Kingdom in Liberty v. The United Kingdom.156 The Strasbourg Court found that 
the 1985 Act authorizing the interception of communications passing between 
the United Kingdom and an external receiver violated Article 8 for the 
following three reasons: (1) There was no limit on the type of external 
communications that could be included in a warrant; (2) the Act allowed the 
State authorities broad discretion on the question of which communications, out 
of the total volume of those physically captured, would be read or listened to; 
and ( 3) the procedures to be followed in selecting specific communications for 
examination, sharing, storing, and destroying were not set out in a manner 
accessible to the public.157 A similar conclusion was reached in the subsequent 
case of Iordachi v. Moldova.158 
Moving to the second part of the inquiry—whether the interference is 
necessary in a democratic society—the Strasbourg Court has repeatedly 
affirmed that secret surveillance measures, although seriously interfering with 
the right to respect of private life, may be considered admissible insofar as they 
are aimed at protecting national security.159 The member states, however, are 
not allowed unlimited discretion in designing such programs: “in view of the 
risk that a system of secret surveillance for the protection of national security 
may undermine or even destroy democracy under the cloak of defending it,” 
governments are required to put in place “adequate and effective guarantees 
against abuse.”160 With this requirement, the Court imposes a classic 
proportionality test, which must take into consideration “all the circumstances 
of the case, such as the nature, scope and duration of the possible measures; the 
grounds required for ordering them; the authorities competent to authorize, 
carry out and supervise them; and the kind of remedy provided by the national 
law.”161 
To illustrate the application of these principles, in the case of Weber and 
Others v. Germany, the ECtHR came to the conclusion that the German 
program that permitted the wiretapping of international telephone calls for 
purposes of counterterrorism, the so-called G-10 Act, as modified by the Fight 
against Crime Act of 28 October 1994,162 satisfied both of Article 8’s 
 
 155.  Id. §§ 93–95 (emphasis added) 
 156.  Liberty v. U.K., App. No. 58243/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. §§ 64–70 (2008). 
 157.  Id. §§ 64–69. 
 158.  Iordachi v. Moldova, App. No. 25198/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009). 
 159.  Weber Decision, supra note 151, § 106; see also Klass v. Germany, App. No. 5029/71, Eur. Ct. 
H.R. § 49 (1978). 
 160.  Weber Decision, supra note 151, § 106. 
 161.  Id. 
 162.  Act of 13 August 1968 on Restrictions on the Secrecy of Mail, Post and Telecommunications 
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requirements of “law” and being “necessary in a democratic society.” The law 
defined in a clear and precise manner the offenses that could give rise to an 
interception order, the duration of the interception, the categories of persons 
likely to be intercepted, the maximum duration of monitoring measures, the 
procedure to be followed for examining and using the data, and the 
circumstances in which recordings could be erased or tapes destroyed.163 
An analysis of TEMPORA, one of the most intrusive and sophisticated of 
the national security programs revealed by Snowden, sheds light on how these 
principles might be applied to mass surveillance. There are two primary 
components to the program. First, it appears that the GCHQ has been allowed 
to access, in secret and without controls, the personal data pertaining to U.K. 
citizens gathered by the NSA under the Section 702 program.164 If this is 
confirmed, then such an activity would amount to a circumvention of the 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, which requires the government to 
adopt specified safeguards when intercepting communications of individuals 
located in the United Kingdom. Without a detailed and accessible legal basis, 
and in the absence of any “adequate and effective guarantee against abuse,”165 it 
is difficult to see how such an interference with private life could be considered 
legitimate by the Strasbourg Court. Second, it has been reported that the 
GCHQ has intercepted more than 200 fiber optic cables landing in the United 
Kingdom, storing and extracting data related to “external communications” of 
primarily non-U.K. citizens. The intercepted communications include both the 
content and metadata of telephone calls and internet traffic, such as e-mails, 
Facebook entries, and Google searches. Although authorized under certificated 
warrants issued pursuant to section 8(4) of the Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act 2000, this surveillance seems to be disproportionate insofar as the 
bulk interception of communications on a continuous and indiscriminate basis 
comprises blanket surveillance of thousands and possibly of millions of 
people.166 Additionally, U.S. officials have allegedly been granted extensive 
access to this data, again in the absence of a clear and transparent legal basis.167 
Will the European courts rule against the mass surveillance programs 
 
(Gesetz_zur Beschränkung des_Brief-, Post- und_Fernmeldegeheimnisses), as modified by the Fight 
against Crime Act of 28 October 1994 (Verbrechensbekämpfungsgesetz); see Matthias Bäcker, Das G 10 
und die Kompetenzordnung, 2011 DÖV 840. 
 163.  Weber Decision, supra note 151, § 92. 
 164.  NATIONAL PROGRAMS FOR MASS SURVEILLANCE, supra note 101, at 53, 55. 
 165.  Weber Decision, supra note 151, § 106. 
 166.  TEMPORA was challenged before the U.K. Investigatory Powers Tribunal.  The Tribunal 
held in favor of one of the claimants (an Egyptian nongovernmental organization), on the basis of a 
breach of Article 8 of the ECHR, in light of the exceedingly long time of retention of the intercepted 
data. See Liberty v. Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, UKIPTrib 13_77-H 
(2015) As regards the other claimants, the Tribunal held that the sharing of information between the 
U.S. and Britain in the frame of the PRISM and TEMPORA programs was in breach of Art. 8 ECHR, 
because the domestic law was not sufficiently transparent and accessible to the public, prior to the 
disclosures made during the court proceedings. Id. 
 167.  NATIONAL PROGRAMS FOR MASS SURVEILLANCE, supra note 101, at 55. 
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carried out by several national agencies, allegedly in collaboration with the 
NSA? Although it is hard to tell at the moment, some indications suggest that 
they might. In 2013, the ECtHR, following a preliminary examination of its 
admissibility, decided to give priority, under rule 41, to the application lodged 
by Big Brother Watch and Others (a coalition of nongovernmental organizations 
engaged with the protection of privacy and other civil liberties) against the 
United Kingdom.168 The applicants have complained that the TEMPORA 
program, analyzed above, has no adequate basis in domestic law and is not 
proportionate under Article 8 of the Convention.169 
The CJEU has also recently taken a more categorical approach to privacy. 
Since the Snowden revelations, the Court has decided three important data-
protection cases: Digital Rights Ireland v. Minister of Communications Ireland 
and others,170 Google Spain v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos and 
Mario Costeja González,171 and Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner.172 All 
bear witness to the Court’s hardening stance on the right to personal data 
protection. The judgments also demonstrate considerable attention to the 
extraterritorial dimension of the policy problem and the challenges of 
safeguarding the right in the face of market and government surveillance that 
occurs within other jurisidictions, particularly the United States.  And lurking in 
the background, or in the case of Schrems, squarely on the face of the judgment, 
is the deeply troubling policy problem that has been brought to the fore by the 
Snowden revelations: How can privacy be protected in the face of 
unprecedented advances in digital technologies, the growing concentration of 
power and personal data in the hands of market actors, and the seemingly 
unlimited appetite for that data among law enforcement, national security, and 
other government actors?173 
 On April 8, 2014, in Digital Rights Ireland, the CJEU found that 
Directive 2006/24/EC was invalid.174 The so-called Data Retention Directive 
required electronic communication providers to collect and retain all traffic and 
location data of all their clients concerning fixed telephony, mobile telephony, 
Internet access, Internet e-mail and Internet telephony for a period between six 
months and two years. These metadata were to be made available “for the 
purpose of the investigation, detection and prosecution of serious crime.”175 The 
 
 168.  Big Brother Watch v. U.K., App. No. 58170/13, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2013). 
 169.  The complaint is available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents 
/libe/dv/bbw_org_ep_ck_v_uk_/bbw_org_ep_ck_v_uk_en.pdf. 
 170. Case C-293/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v. Minister for Communic’s, Marine and Natural 
Res., 2014 E.C.R (2014). 
 171.  Case-131/12 (2014) (not yet reported). 
 172. Case-362/14 (2015) (not yet reported). 
 173. On the underlying social and technological context and its transformation, see Fred H. Cate et 
al., Systematic Government Access to Private-Sector Data, 2 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 195 (2012); 
Richards, supra note 119, at 1936–41. 
 174.  Digital Rights Ireland Ltd., supra note 169. 
 175.  Id. at § 16. 
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CJEU found the Directive incompatible with Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which respectively enshrine the 
right to privacy and the right to personal data protection. 
 In Digital Rights Ireland, the CJEU reasoned that the interference with 
privacy was particularly serious because of the huge quantity and type of data 
involved, together with the fact that the data were retained and subsequently 
used without any knowledge of the data subject. In the view of the CJEU, the 
data-retention requirement was “likely to generate in the minds of the persons 
concerned the feeling that their private lives are the subject of constant 
surveillance.”176 In the judgment, the CJEU acknowledged that the objectives of 
the Directive were of the utmost importance, being related to the fight against 
organized crime and terrorism177 but found that the interference with privacy 
was not proportionate to the legitimate aims being pursued. To reach this 
conclusion, the Court assigned particular relevance to the following elements: 
(1) The data retention program applied to all persons without limitations, and 
even to persons “for whom there is no evidence capable of suggesting that their 
conduct might have a link, even an indirect or remote one, with serious crime;” 
(2) the program covered all data, irrespective of any relationship between such 
data and a threat to public security; (3) the Directive set down no substantive 
and procedural conditions to regulate access to and use of the data by the 
competent national authorities; (4) such access was not made dependent “on a 
prior review carried out by a court or by an independent administrative body 
whose decision seeks to limit access to the data and their use to what is strictly 
necessary;” and (5) the retention period was fixed in general terms, between six 
months and two years, without a distinction being made among the different 
types of data and without employing criteria designed to guarantee that the 
retention period be limited to what was strictly necessary in light of the aims 
pursued.178 
The CJEU also pointed to another flaw in the Data Retention Directive: it 
did not prohibit the retention of the metadata outside of the EU, 
with the result that it cannot be held that the control, explicitly required by Article 
8(3) of the Charter, by an independent authority of compliance with the requirements 
of protection and security, as referred to in the two previous paragraphs, is fully 
ensured. Such a control, carried out on the basis of EU law, is an essential component 
of the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data.
179
 
The danger alluded to—transferring data to less privacy-protective 
jurisdictions—could be very well be interpreted as a specific reference to NSA 
surveillance.  
 Only one month after Digital Rights Ireland, the CJEU handed down its 
judgment in Google Spain.  There the CJEU found Google liable for violating 
 
 176.  Id. § 37. 
 177.  Id. § 51. 
 178.  Id. §§ 51–68. 
 179.  Id. § 68. 
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the so-called right-to-be-forgotten in the EU Data Protection Directive. 180  That 
right is linked to the right of individual access and correction, discussed earlier 
in this article, and requires that firms like Google expunge from their computer 
systems personal information that fails to comply with data-protection 
standards such as accuracy and proportionality. In a critical part of the 
judgment, the Court found in favor of broad territorial application of the EU 
Directive to ensure that European data-protection rights could not be 
circumvented by processing personal data outside the EU.181 Even though 
Google argued that the EU Directive was not applicable because all the data 
processing connected with its search engine occurred in the the United States, 
the CJEU found that a corporate presence in the EU for purposes of selling 
advertising space was enough to bring Google within the territorial scope of the 
Directive.  
 The last in this trilogy of data-protection cases is Schrems v. Data 
Protection Commissioner.  In the wake of the NSA scandal, an Austrian citizen 
and subscriber of Facebook, Maximilian Schrems, lodged a complaint before 
the Irish Data Protection Commissioner. He claimed that Facebook Ireland 
systematically transferred the data of its European customers to Facebook 
USA’s servers in the United States, where they were stored.  Facebook was a 
participant in the Safe Harbor program and therefore, as explained earlier in 
this article, was entitled to a finding of adequacy for purposes of satisfying the 
requirements of the EU Data Protection Directive on data transfers to third 
countries. Schrems, however, relied on the Snowden revelations of Facebook’s 
involvement in the PRISM program (which allows the NSA access to the data 
of EU citizens held by Internet companies) to argue that the transfers violated 
the substantive and procedural guarantees of the Directive and the European 
Charter of Fundamental Rights (Articles 7 and 8).  When the Data Protection 
Commissioner refused to take action, Schrems challenged the Commissioner’s 
decision in Irish court, which in turn referred the issue to the CJEU.   
 The CJEU held in favor of Schrems, against Safe Harbor. Although the 
judgment touches on a number of issues, the most important one for purposes 
of this article is the question of whether adherence to the Safe Harbor 
principles guarantees the adequacy of data protection for European data 
transferred to the United States.  The Court’s answer was a resounding “No.”  
The Court faulted the Safe Harbor agreement and the accompanying 
Commission decision on adequacy for including a broad exception for U.S. 
government access to personal data based on “national security, public interest, 
or law enforcement requirements” or based on “statute, government regulation, 
or case-law.”182 In assessing adequacy, the Commission had focused exclusively 
on the private sector and had failed to assess whether the legal standards 
 
 180.  Case-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (2014) (not yet 
reported). 
 181. Id. § 54. 
 182. Id. §§ 84–87 
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applicable to government actors were comparable to those under EU data-
protection law.183  
 After pointing out these flaws in the Commission’s decision, the Court 
set down the criteria that would have to be satisfied for the United States to be 
considered an adequate jurisdiction.  These criteria are grounded on the legal 
basis and purpose, as well as proportionality, requirements that have been 
central to this area of constitutional law since the early 1970s and that have 
already been discussed in the context of the German Constitutional Court and 
the ECtHR.  The Court found that indiscriminate access to electronic data, in 
particular the content of communications, would violate the essence of the right 
to privacy.  Any law serving as the basis for a interference with the right to 
privacy would have to include “objective criterion . . . to determine the limits of 
the access of the public authorities to the data, and of its subsequent use, for 
purposes which are specific, strictly restricted and capable of justifying the 
interference.”184 In addition, the right of access, correction, and in some cases, 
erasure, would have to be enforceable through the courts.185 Since the 
Commission made no such findings, the Court held that the Safe Harbor 
adequacy determination was invalid.   
IV 
CONCLUSION 
The revelations of NSA surveillance are but the last, albeit perhaps the most 
dramatic, episode in transatlantic privacy regulation. Whatever one might think 
of the NSA programs, they have undoubtedly had repercussions for privacy and 
transatlantic relations more broadly speaking. In July 2013, the European 
Parliament passed a Resolution calling for an official investigation into the NSA 
programs and instructed its Parliamentary Committee on Civil Liberties, 
Justice, and Home Affairs to conduct an in-depth inquiry into the matter.186 
After six months of intense activity, on January 8, 2014, the Rapporteur Claude 
Moraes published a Draft Report that called for a Parliament Resolution 
condemning the programs of indiscriminate surveillance of citizens and 
proposing a complex package of reforms aimed at improving privacy 
safeguards.187 The Report, approved by the European Parliament on March 12, 
 
 183. Id. §§ 88–90. 
 184. Id. § 93. 
 185. Id. § 95. 
 186.  Resolution of 4 July 2013 on the US National Security Agency Surveillance Program, 
Surveillance Bodies in Various Member States and Their Impact on EU Citizens’ Privacy, 2013/2682 
(RSP) (2013), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2013-
0322&language=EN. 
 187.  All the relevant documents are collected in LIBE COMMITTEE INQUIRY, ELECTRONIC MASS 
SURVEILLANCE OF EU CITIZENS: PROTECTING FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN A DIGITAL AGE (2013–
2014), 
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2014, demonstrates the climate of distrust created by the NSA programs. This 
climate has compromised some of the arduous efforts of the past decades to 
overcome regulatory differences and create a harmonized privacy scheme to 
facilitate transatlantic trade and to improve cooperation on security and law 
enforcement. The Parliament Report called for immediate suspension of Safe 
Harbor and, as discussed above, a year later, the Court of Justice invalidated 
the Commission decision granting “adequate” data-protection status to those 
U.S. firms that subscribe to the Safe Harbor principles. Even earlier, in October 
2013, the Parliament passed a resolution advocating suspension of TFTP II. 
There have also been consequences for transatlantic trade relations more 
broadly speaking. The 2014 Parliament Report called for the suspension of the 
negotiations for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement 
until the conclusion of negotiations on a transatlantic “Umbrella Agreement” 
setting down data-protection guarantees for personal information exchanged 
for law enforcement purposes.188 Although Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership Agreement negotiations have gone forward, there is currently a 
significant push to also conclude the Umbrella Agreement, without which it is 
unlikely that the European Parliament will ratify any trade deal at all.  One of 
the biggest hurdles to finalizing and ratifying the Umbrella Agreement is the 
double standard for U.S. citizens and EU citizens in U.S. law, a double standard 
that has been particularly evident in the operation of the Section 702 program. 
It would be misleading to portray the European reaction to the Snowden 
leaks as unequivocally hostile. The member states and their governments, 
individually and through the Council of Ministers, have been fairly silent. 
Moreover, there have been numerous attempts by interior ministers and their 
supporters to enhance EU-wide surveillance in the interest of fighting the threat 
of extremism and terrorism. For instance, the President of the European 
Council, Donald Tusk, has recently urged the European Parliament to pass a 
longstanding proposal for an EU PNR that would mimic the system in place in 
the United States.189 What can be said, however, is that the vigorous 
transatlantic debate on privacy can contribute to protecting both sides from 
complacency. There is no doubt that personal data processing can produce, 
both in the market and the surveillance contexts, significant benefits. There is 
also no question that robust privacy guarantees are necessary and the 
transatlantic debate has had a positive impact on privacy. As with many policy 
issues, the debate on privacy is somewhat lopsided and the regulatory actors 
most directly impacted can sometimes use the ebb and flow of public attention 
to avoid institutional reform.190 As public outrage over the Snowden affair fades 
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and government and corporate actors seek to strategically delay—and perhaps 
avoid—legal change, the existence of a symbolic set of fundamental rights and a 
vocal set of watchdogs in Europe can help sustain attention to the policy 
problem and keep privacy reform on the public agenda. 
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